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Grounding as a Collaborative Process
Luciana Benotti








Collaborative grounding is a fundamental as-
pect of human-human dialog which allows
people to negotiate meaning. In this paper
we argue that it is missing from current deep
learning approaches to dialog and interactive
systems. Our central point is that making mis-
takes and being able to recover from them col-
laboratively is a key ingredient in grounding
meaning. We illustrate the pitfalls of being
unable to ground collaboratively, discuss what
can be learned from the language acquisition
and dialog systems literature, and reflect on
how to move forward.
1 Introduction
Collaborative grounding is shaped by constraints
that are not explicit in successful dialog turns.
These constraints combine information from world
causal relations, the task under discussion, the com-
municative intents of the dialog partners, and much
else besides. They are used to negotiate meaning,
to decide which beliefs to add to the shared com-
mon ground, which is constructed using the joint
attention of the dialog partners to things either real
or imagined. Once beliefs are grounded, they can-
not be magically ungrounded without further ne-
gotiation, for the dialog partners are committed to
them. But it’s tricky:
Human-analogous natural language understanding
(NLU) is a grand challenge of artificial intelligence,
which involves mastery of the structure and use of
language and the ability to ground it in the world.
(Bender and Koller, 2020)
What does “the ability to ground it in the world”
involve? Implicit constraints that shape ground-
ing become explicit when communication starts to
break. We claim that making mistakes and being
able to recover from them collaboratively is a key
ingredient of the ability to ground.
We proceed as follows. We first discuss obsta-
cles to current research on dialog and interactive
systems (Section 2) and then present working defi-
nitions of collaborative grounding and related con-
cepts (Section 3). Section 4 plays with scenarios
illustrating the pitfalls of being unable to ground
collaboratively; we then turn to the language acqui-
sition literature for insight into how humans do it
(Section 5) and to the dialog systems literature to
discuss what is known (Section 6). In Section 7,
we reflect on the progress made and make recom-
mendations, while in Section 8 we note possible
objections to our account and conclude.
2 Motivation
Dialog and interactive systems is one of the most
popular research areas in computational linguistics
nowadays. But — unlike machine translation and
information retrieval — deep learning approaches
to it have had little impact on products that people
use daily.1 In 1991, cognitive scientist Brennan
asked: Why is it that natural language has yet to
become a widely used modality of human/computer
interaction? (Brennan, 1991), and in 2020 the
AI researchers de Vries, Bahdanau and Manning
(de Vries et al., 2020) asked the same question
yet again. In 1990, research on dialog systems
used symbolic approaches; today neural generative
models are favoured. Methods have changed, but
the question remains the same.
Neural generative models offer flexibility, can be
easily adapted to new domains, and require mini-
mal domain engineering. But though they generate
fluent responses (Serban et al., 2016), the result is
often boring and repetitive (“I don’t know”) or they
contradict themselves, or wander away from the
1Almost all commercial dialog systems currently avail-
able seem to be based on pre-deep learning pipeline architec-
tures (Takanobu et al., 2020) in spite of efforts such as the
Alexa Prize (Ram et al., 2018; Gabriel et al., 2020).
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topic of conversation (Li et al., 2016). De Vries
et al (2020) note that neural generative models as-
sume that the required data is available and ap-
propriate. They say: Ideally, the data used for
training and evaluating should reflect the intents
and linguistic phenomena found in real-world ap-
plications and be of reasonable size to accommo-
date modern data-intensive methods. They remark
that data quality and quantity are hard to reconcile,
and that the community has prioritized quantity
over quality; thus dialog systems are inadequate
because datasets are poor. But ineffective use of
dialog history seems to play a role too. Sankar
et al (2019) study model sensitivity to artificially
introduced context perturbations at test time. Work-
ing with multi-turn dialog datasets, they found that
commonly used neural dialog architectures, like
recurrent and transformer-based seq2seq models,
are rarely sensitive to perturbations such as missing
or reordered utterances, and word shuffling.
The ineffective use of dialog history often goes
unnoticed because of the evaluation practices that
are common nowadays. Automatic metrics such
as BLUE, ROUGE, and so on, do not correlate
well with human judgement, either for semantic
preserving natural language generation or for dia-
log (Mathur et al., 2020). For human evaluation,
it is not enough to show a few turns to the annota-
tors (Liu et al., 2016). This does not measure how
well the system is able to recover from its own mis-
takes; a human-in-the-loop evaluation that judges
the overall interaction is needed for that (Walker
et al., 1997).
Graphical user interfaces (GUIs), on the other
hand, tend to get things right. We agree with Bren-
nan (1998) that GUIs are more successful in every-
day use than dialog systems (DSs) because GUIs
enable collaborative grounding effectively while
deep learning approaches to DSs do not.
3 What is collaborative grounding?
In this section we provide working definitions of
collaborative grounding and other key concepts. To
get the ball rolling, we take the common ground to
be the commitments that the dialog partners have
(explicitly or implicitly) agreed upon.
Collaborative grounding not symbol grounding
Collaborative grounding is the process of seek-
ing and providing incremental evidence of mutual
understanding through dialog; we view the ongo-
ing exchange of speaker and hearer roles as fun-
damental to conversation (Benotti, 2010; Benotti
and Blackburn, 2014). When the speaker believes
that the dialog is on track, positive evidence of
understanding is provided in different forms (de-
pending on the communication channel) such as ex-
plicit acknowledgements and eye contact. Negative
evidence of understanding signals that something
needs to be negotiated before the dialog partners
can commit — and negative evidence is ubiquitous:
Conversations with other people are rarely fluent
and without mishap, and people do not expect them
to be. (Brennan, 1991)
Mishaps lead to the need for repair. Repair is
fundamental to conversational analysis (Schegloff
et al., 1977; Schegloff, 2007), the linguistic study
of language-driven social interactions. Together
with the more psychologically oriented work of
Clark and his colleagues (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs,
1986; Clark, 1996), conversational analysis, is a
key inspiration for the lines of research that we
review in this paper.
We consider collaborative grounding to be
distinct from symbol grounding (Harnad, 1990)
though they interact in interesting ways (Larsson,
2018). Symbol grounding (or perceptual ground-
ing, or language grounded in vision) is the set of
capabilities that link symbols with perceptions; it
is an important research area (Roy, 2005) in which
accurate connections between systems’ linguistic
representations and sensor data are often viewed as
proof that a system means what it says. These con-
nections are important for meaning, but we agree
with De Vault et al. (2006) that perceptual ground-
ing is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify the
attribution of linguistic meaning. Human percep-
tion and memory are neither accurate nor stable,
and different people have different abilities and lim-
itations. Human meaning attributions do not rely
on the accurate perceptions and perfect memory
sought by symbol grounding, but on a collabora-
tive negotiation process in which language speakers
coordinate their perceptual memories and linguistic
usage with other members of their communities. If
a dialog system commits itself to negotiate its mean-
ings collaboratively when perception and memory
falter, then we claim that this gives grounds for
assigning linguistic meaning to it. See Section 4
and A for examples.
Collaborative grounding: basic mechanisms
When people talk to each other, they tailor their
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utterances to their partners. People can talk with
friends, strangers, disembodied voices on the tele-
phone, readers who will come along after they are
gone, foreigners, children, and even dogs. Flex-
ibility in tailoring utterances for a particular ad-
dressee has been documented even among the very
young; five year olds have been observed to use
more simple language and a different pitch range
when talking to three year olds than they do talk-
ing to adults (Golinkoff, 1986). People adapt by
initially estimating the common ground they share
with a particular partner, by monitoring the posi-
tive and negative evidences of understanding (aka
grounding acts) and by adapting their initial com-
mon ground estimate accordingly.
Alikhani and Stone (2020) explain that dialog
systems can participate in collaborative ground-
ing by ensuring they get attention and feedback
from their users and tracking user state. Such
pragmatic mechanisms have been explored, in-
cluding those for dealing with problems related
to joint attention (Koller et al., 2012; Koleva et al.,
2015; Tan et al., 2020), engagement (Bohus and
Horvitz, 2014; Foster et al., 2017), turn taking and
incremental interpretation (Schlangen and Skantze,
2009; Selfridge et al., 2012; DeVault and Traum,
2013; Eshghi et al., 2015) corrections and clar-
ifications (Villalba et al., 2017; Ginzburg and
Fernández, 2010) and dialog management (DeVault
and Stone, 2009; Selfridge et al., 2012). These
mechanisms have been studied for different kinds
of applications (Denis, 2010; Dzikovska et al.,
2010, 2012). In Section 6 we discuss this research
tradition; we believe it can provide top-down re-
search guidance for research on dialog systems that
commit to what they say.
Collaborative grounding: exposing limitations
As we said at the start, collaborative grounding
is shaped by constraints that may not be explicit
in successful dialog turns. Dialog partners use
constraints to negotiate meaning, adding beliefs to
the common ground through their joint attention
to a real or imagined world. Further negotiation
is required to unground a belief; unilateral belief
withdrawal leads to a sense of commitment being
brushed aside.
A dialog system is an unusual kind of linguis-
tic partner. A user must figure out what its lim-
itations are and then design her utterances with
them in mind. Limitations may arise due to gaps
in grammatical coverage, an unexpectedly narrow
domain vocabulary, or a lack of common sense;
by common sense we here mean the basic knowl-
edge and competencies required for successful
navigation through a world full of objects, time,
money, politeness, animals, people, and so on.
One much-studied component of commonsense
involves causality (Pearl, 2009) and the frame prob-
lem (Shanahan, 2016), the ability to figure out what
changes and what does not change due to various
kinds of (inter)action. Our point, however, is not
that dialog systems need all these components of
commonsense — it is rather that they need enough
interpersonal common sense to not try and hide
their inadequacies!
Often, however, these limitations are deliberately
well hidden by the designers — who thereby unin-
tentionally inhibit users from employing the pow-
erful meaning-negotiation strategies available in a
human-human dialog. Dialog systems may gen-
erate words they cannot understand, thus building
false expectations of common ground in their di-
alog partner. Humans cannot adapt and ground
collaboratively if a dialog system fails to expose
its own limitations. In the next section we explore
examples of such failures.
4 Test scenarios
This section uses playful scenarios to illustrate the
implications of not learning to do collaborative
grounding appropriately. We start with a text adven-
ture scenario, then consider a multimodal scenario
followed by a BlenderBot example, and conclude
by contrasting these with the collaborative ground-
ing typical of GUIs.
4.1 Dungeon intelligence
Consider the following interaction with the text
game adventure AI Dungeon2 powered by GPT-
2 (Radford et al., 2019). The Webtext dataset used
to train GPT-2 contains web content from Reddit
links that have been rated as trustable by some Red-
dit users, probably including blogs, online news,
and other discourse data.
In the example, when we detect a problem, we
prompt Dungeon AI (DAI) with a negative ground-
ing act (for example, but before you only had seven,
how many are there really?). This makes the incon-
sistency with the previous turns explicit; in effect,
we offer to negotiate. But the model blithely ig-
2https://play.aidungeon.io/ accessed on 19/08/2020
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nores the negative evidence and talks about some-
thing else:
DAI: You are wearing nondescript clothing, and
you manage to escape without being recognized.
You open the purse and find seven gold coins, which
is good since you only planned to steal a little.
Human: How many coins are there in the purse?
DAI: You count the coins and find that you have
eighty one coins, which is good since you planned
to steal just a little. You think to yourself “I should
be able to afford a room tonight.”
Human: But before you only had seven, how many
are there really?
DAI: You head to the first inn you see, which seems
to be a place where merchants stay. The desk clerk
is a young woman who is probably only just thir-
teen or fourteen.
We posed this question several times but the
model never tried to negotiate the inconsistency
(for example, by replying: there are 81 coins, I
saw only some of them before). In A there is a con-
tinuation of this dialog, illustrating other kinds of
inconsistency and lack of collaborative grounding.
Bender and Koller (2020) argue that language
models like GPT-2 are unable to ground language
in the world: because they are only exposed to form,
it is unreasonable to expect them to negotiate mean-
ing. Others propose to tackle all kinds of grounding
experimentally, by collecting datasets grounded in
various modalities, developing models that learn
from them, and using leaderboards (Linzen, 2020)
and checklists (Ribeiro et al., 2020) to measure
how effectively the model generalizations aligns
with those of humans. So let’s turn to a multimodal
task: visual dialog.
4.2 Visual dialog
Visual dialogs have long been a test-bed for natural
language understanding. They played a prominent
role in early work on natural language understand-
ing (Winograd, 1972) and are now the focus of an
active community investigating the interplay be-
tween computer vision and computational linguis-
tics (Baldridge et al., 2018; Shekhar et al., 2019).
Important progress has been obtained thanks to the
recent release of datasets like VisDial (Das et al.,
2017) and GuessWhat?! (de Vries et al., 2017); the
former contains chit-chat conversations about an
image whereas the latter is a visual game, hence its
dialogs are goal oriented.
As we see in Figure 1, GuessWhat?! is a coop-
erative game: two players attempt to identify an
object in an image. The Questioner has to guess
the referent by asking yes/no questions; the Oracle
knows the referent object and provides the answers.
In the figure, the referent is the second woman from
right to left of the group of four women in the back.
The Oracle model that includes the dialog his-
tory as an input (de Vries et al., 2017), correctly
answers 9 out of 10 questions for the dialog in
Figure 1; it only fails on question number 9, in-
correctly answering “no”. But question 9 does not
look particularly hard; why does it create a prob-
lem? Because it trades on the common ground built
by the previous dialog turns. Humans use common
ground here, as shallower methods fail (the refer-
ent is not salient in the image). Indeed — except
for one turn — Figure 1 is just visual question an-
swering; the system fails on precisely the question
that cannot be correctly answered without using
the common ground built by the previous turns. Is
this error only due to the rarity of such dialog turns
(as (Agarwal et al., 2020) argue), something which
might be fixed by better datasets?
The answer may be “no”. Collaborative ground-
ing in visual dialog has two characteristics that
make it difficult for current machine learning meth-
ods: it is not only that turns requiring common
ground may be infrequent in these datasets, in ad-
dition — as in our example — they may not be
lexicalized. Common ground dependency is easier
to spot when it is lexicalized with explicit pronouns
(e.g. ‘them’ in “is it one of them?” in position 7).
If the question “is it the second one?” had been
asked in position 2, the model’s answer “no” would
have been correct, as “second” would then refer to
the second (highly salient) man in the row. But in
position 9 the correct answer is “yes” due to the
common ground built by turns 6 to 8. Common
ground dependence may be less lexicalized in vi-
sual dialog as the visual modality tends to favor
visual saliency to resolve ambiguities.
As we said in Section 3, common ground is
the set of commitments that the dialog partners
have agreed upon, while collaborative grounding is
the process by which such commitments are made.
Common ground dependence, as illustrated in turn
9 in Figure 1, may not be as frequent and as lexical-
ized in multimodal datasets as current data hungry
models need (Agarwal et al., 2020; de Vries et al.,
2020). But better datasets alone will not solve the
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1. It is a person? yes
2. It is a male? no
3. Is it a female? yes
4. Is she in the red dress? no
5. She is in black? yes
6. In the back from right to left you see four women? yes
7. Is it one of them? yes
8. Right to left, is it the first one, gray sweater? no
9. Is it the second one? yes
10. Does she look to have panty hose on? yes
Figure 1: Human-human dialog on the Guesswhat?! referential task extracted from (de Vries et al., 2017). The
example illustrates the linguistic variability present in this task.
problem: we need models that are trying to do
collaborative grounding. That is, we need models
that are not only led by the lexical cues in the di-
alog but also by pragmatic mechanisms reflected
by timely exchanges between speaker and hearer.
So let us turn to a model that has been exposed to
such pragmatic mechanisms in its data.
4.3 BlenderBot
Facebook AI has built and open-sourced Blender-
Bot, which they call the largest-ever open-domain
chatbot. It outperforms systems such as Google’s
Meena (Adiwardana et al., 2020) in terms of en-
gagement and also feels more human, according
to human evaluators (Smith et al., 2020). Blender-
Bot attempts to combine different conversational
skills including empathy, knowledge, and personal-
ity together in one system. The trained models are
available for research (Smith et al., 2020) in differ-
ent sizes and with different hardware requirements.
The largest model has 9.4 Billion parameters, the
middle sized version has 2.7 Billion.
Unlike the GPT-2 model we discussed earlier
which is mostly trained on discourse data, Blender-
Bot is pre-trained with a large dataset of multi-party
conversations extracted from the Reddit Pushshift
dataset (Baumgartner et al., 2020). The dataset
consists of free-form exchanges between multiple
speakers and hearers where collaborative ground-
ing is occurring. Thus the data on which Blender-
Bot models are pre-trained includes positive and
negative evidence of understanding. BlenderBot
models are then fine-tuned on dialogs that have
been crowdsourced to exhibit empathy, knowledge
about some particular topic, a consistent persona,
and on a crowdsourced dataset that blends these
abilities together (Smith et al., 2020).
The following interaction was generated using
the middle sized model trained on Reddit Pushshift
through July 2019 (Smith et al., 2020); we call the
model BB2.7B.3
Human: Do you know Blender?
BB2.7B: Yes, I’ve used it a little bit. I am not very
good at it, though.
Human: But I don’t mean the 3D software.
BB2.7B: Oh, I see. Yeah, I know a little bit about it.
What do you like to do with it?
Human: I mean Blender, the chatbot. Have you
used it?
BB2.7B: Oh, yes, I have used it. I like to use it to
make 3D models.4
This fragment explores BlenderBot reaction to
negative evidence (but I don’t mean the 3D soft-
ware). It does not ignore it, as the Dungeon AI
based on GPT-2 does. Indeed it replies with a co-
herent follow up and it includes a sentence that
seems intended to acknowledge the misunderstand-
ing (Oh, I see). However, the rest of the dialog
shows that in spite of recognizing the structure
of negative evidence, BlenderBot is unable to in-
tegrate negative grounding into the conversation
consistently.
4.4 Graphical user interfaces
GUIs exploit graphical elements that mimic physi-
cal objects: we can point, drag and toss them in the
trash bin. GUIs respond by updating immediately,
thus the relationship between the user’s action and
the graphical result is utterly clear. Even though
GUIs are primarily graphical, they are also con-
versational and implement pragmatic mechanisms;
3The model is available at https://parl.ai/projects/recipes/
4See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-op yOXBNEY
for the full dialog.
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indeed, their response is as timely and relevant
as backchannels in human conversation (acknowl-
edgments, nods, eye contact; see (Gravano and
Hirschberg, 2011)). As they enable direct manipu-
lation, they trivially solve the linguistic reference
problem. They model common ground by tracking
what is visible to the user. They model joint atten-
tion graphically through focus. And they do not
suffer from the frame problem: consistency is care-
fully preserved in GUI design (Brennan, 1998); if
you move something, it will stay there until some-
body moves it back. They ask for both positive
(e.g. ok) and negative (e.g. cancel) evidence for
understanding. GUIs are good at exposing their
own limitations and most users are good at adapt-
ing to them — some even overadapt and blame
themselves for misunderstandings. For example,
take the dialog box window in Figure 2. The sys-
tem wants positive grounding evidence from the
user but (confusingly) it does not offer the choice
of giving negative grounding evidence (the conven-
tional negative grounding label for buttons in GUIs
is “cancel”).
Figure 2: Sample dialog box not allowing negative evi-
dence of grounding: there is no cancel button.
5 Human language acquisition
Clark (2001) presents evidence that collaborative
grounding underpins the process of first language
acquisition in babies. She argues that collaborative
grounding offers a way of placing a new piece of
the language at the center of joint attention of the
language learner and her caregiver. In particular, it
is through such pragmatic mechanisms that:
(a) children solve the general mapping prob-
lem between form and meaning when offered new
words; (b) they take up conventional terms for un-
familiar objects and events, and see how they re-
late to familiar terms; (c) they take up information
about what they should have said when they have
produced an erroneous utterance when offered re-
formulations. (Clark, 2001)
Babies around one year old have been shown to
perform negative grounding acts in order to repair
a request that they made (e.g. “doll!”) whose inten-
tion (e.g. “getting the doll”) was misunderstood by
an adult. Babies tend to do the repair act even when
the request is satisfied by other means (maybe the
frustrated adult gave the baby all the toys including
the doll — yet the baby takes the doll and repeats
“doll!”). In other words, they care that their inten-
tion is understood, not only satisfied (Ackermann
et al., 2014; Tomasello et al., 2005). Tomasello et
al argue that this is a basic ability, one required for
the development of language and cognitive capabil-
ities like belief attribution. Golinkoff describes this
ability as follows:
Importantly, from their earliest forays into lin-
guistic communication, infants engage in a “nego-
tiation of meaning” in which they request clarifi-
cation from the adult and produce communicative
repairs for the adult when needed [...] Infants
can and will persevere in the face of failure by al-
tering their signals in creative non stereotypical
ways. (Golinkoff, 1986)
Developmental psychologists have documented
repeatedly that children with autism have diffi-
culties signaling non-comprehension and making
appropriate repairs to their own linguistic mes-
sages (Katherin et al., 1990). Deaf and hear-
ing children have been found to employ differ-
ent repair strategies. Deaf children were also
more likely to revise utterances; hearing children
more likely to provide cue repairs. When facing
communication breakdown, both deaf and hearing
children persisted effectively in clarifying utter-
ances (Ciocci SR, 1998).
Allwood and colleagues have documented that
grounding acts have a central role not only for
first language acquisition but also for second lan-
guages (Allwood et al., 1991; Allwood, 1993, 1997;
Allwood and Ahlsen, 1999).
6 Previous work, key insights
In this section we focus on previous work (and key
insights) on collaborative grounding from research
on human dialog analysis and dialog systems. We
won’t cover work from robotics and symbol ground-
ing; for that see e.g. (Roy and Reiter, 2005; Bohus
and Rudnicky, 2009; Bohus et al., 2012; Larsson,
2018).
Long before the deep learning era, dialog system
researchers were aware that constructing common
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ground collaboratively is a key task. A notable
pioneer was Traum (1991; 2003) with his focus on
dialog turns whose conversational role is to pro-
vide positive and negative evidence of grounding
as tools for negotiating meaning. The interaction
between dialog system and human computer inter-
action research was fruitful back then, but the tools
available today for dealing with language variabil-
ity (Mrksic et al., 2017) were not yet developed so
systems were brittle (Allen et al., 2001).
DeVault and Stone (2009) showed that using pre-
defined semantic tags (e.g. colors of objects) falls
short for human dialog; people tend to invent new
tags collaboratively as needed (e.g. using greenish
blue to distinguish one object from a bluer one).
This example could be described as “zooming into”
the details of the available distinctions, but “zoom-
ing out” can occur when limitations are revealed.
Saying I am color blind will (hopefully) shift the
dialog away from reliance on color terms.
Rieser et al. (2010; 2011) and Georgila et
al. (2005) propose using Wizard of Oz data in-
stead of naturally occurring human-human dialog
for training; this puts the spotlight on the necessary
constraints and primes dialog systems with explicit
grounding subdialogs for overcoming limitations,
instead of restricting attention to the limitations
of the channel through which the human crowd-
sourcers interact. This enables data to be collected
that makes explicit strategies for negotiating mean-
ing, and could allow systems to learn particular
collaborative grounding skills relevant for the dia-
log system task.
The surface form of explicit negotiations of
meaning in dialog are frequently non-sentential
utterances (Fernandez, 2006; Fernández et al.,
2007). These include prototypical positive and
negative evidence of grounding such as acknowl-
edgements and clarification requests (Stoyanchev
et al., 2013; Benotti and Blackburn, 2017), but also
less-well-known forms such as self-corrections, re-
jections, modifiers and plain old questions and an-
swers (Purver, 2004; Purver et al., 2018). Such
work makes it evident that non-sentential utter-
ances are not errors of performance and do not
need “fixing” into sentential utterances. Ginzburg
and Fernandez (2010) contributed detailed formal-
izations of how different evidences of grounding
modified the public common ground and the pri-
vate commitments of each dialog participant. A
simple observation in (Ginzburg, 2012) does a big
job in illustrating how different written discourse
and dialog can be: it is often said that the most com-
mon word in written discourse is ‘the’ while the
most frequent word in naturally occurring conversa-
tions in the British National Corpus (Clear, 1993)
is ‘yes’. This makes it evident that the contexts
available to the dialog partners in the aftermath of
an utterance are not identical. Positive acknowl-
edgements (like ‘yes’) signal that the participants
are synchronized and that collaborative grounding
is proceeding smoothly (Denis et al., 2007).
In Section 3 we said that the ongoing exchange
of speaker and hearer roles is fundamental to con-
versation. Schlangen and others have shown in
detail how the ongoing exchange of these roles
is so natural that we complete and correct each
others sentences in incremental approaches to dia-
log (Schlangen and Skantze, 2009; DeVault et al.,
2009; Baumann and Schlangen, 2012; DeVault and
Traum, 2013; Kennington and Schlangen, 2017).
Hough and Schlangen (2017) argue that embod-
ied dialog systems must ground the degree of un-
certainty they have; that is they must expose their
limitations as we argued in Section 3 and as GUI
systems routinely do. They show that humans can
reliably understand the level of uncertainty that a
robot has and act accordingly. No complex natural
language generation abilities are needed for this;
negative grounding can be realized by perceivable
hesitations in a physical act done by the robot.
Koller and colleagues explain how the joint at-
tention of the conversational participants can be
considered and manipulated in order to correct the
common ground. In particular, they show how lis-
tener attention can be manipulated when there is
co-presence through speech and gaze (Koller et al.,
2012; Koleva et al., 2015) and through emphasis in
the text (“press the RED button”) when co-presence
is not possible (Villalba et al., 2017).
In sum, the possibility of making mistakes and
collaboratively recovering from them is one of the
key pragmatic mechanisms for grounding mean-
ing. Much is already understood about this process,
and in Section 7 we recommend using this work to
motivate top down advances in dialog and interac-
tive systems that would complement the bottom up
approaches described in Section 2.
7 Moving forward
In What Computers Can’t Do (1972), Dreyfus
drew on the ideas of philosophers like Merleau-
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Ponty (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) and Heidegger (Hei-
degger, 1993) to criticize symbolic AI. Dreyfus
emphasized the embodied capability of knowing
how, rather than the abstract propositional knowing
that typical of symbolic AI; he did not anticipate
that AI would find plausible methods (deep neural
nets, embodied robotics, distributional semantics)
for exploring knowing how.
Dreyfus’ criticisms may seem obvious in ret-
rospect, but it is useful to recall another philoso-
pher that he cited. In Philosophical Investigations,
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953) critiqued earlier ap-
proaches to language and meaning (including his
own) for failing to take the collaborative aspect of
language into account.
Wittgenstein’s later work foregrounds the impor-
tance of social interaction. In Sections 3 and 4
we remarked that collaborative grounding is more
than symbolic/perceptual grounding, and claimed
that the crucial missing component is provided by
social interaction. In Section 5 we saw that hu-
man children are born into is a complex world of
agents, relationships, affect and much else beside.
Moreover (as the child soon learns) it is a world in
which interesting others collaborate with the help
of a malleable system called language. This system
is capable of expressing multiple types of meaning
— symbolic, scientific, social — which Wittgen-
stein summed up anthropologically: language was
a form of life (Lebensform).
Wittgenstein’s ideas are inspiring, but we don’t
need to look so far back: the work we reviewed
in Sections 5 and 6 shows that social aspects of
language use are central to the roots of meaning,
and cannot be an afterthought in dialog models.
This leads to our recommendations.
Appreciate socially grounded dialog datasets
Dialog datasets are scarce as most naturally cre-
ated dialog corpora cannot be shared due to privacy
issues. Matters are different in written discourse,
which has made great progress thanks to vast cor-
pora from news services, Wikipedia and the like.
We agree with de Vries et al (2020) that more effort
should be put into designing what they call eco-
logically valid datasets for dialog. We agree that
datasets should avoid four common issues: syn-
thetic language, artificial tasks, not working with
prospective users, and single-turn interfaces. We
add two items to this wish-list: (1) dialog grounded
in at least one modality and (2) dialog grounded in
a (symmetric or asymmetric) social collaboration.
Regarding (1), there is much work that has been
done on data collection in the visual (i.e. seeing)
modality (Baldridge et al., 2018) and more recently
in the kinaesthetic (i.e. moving) modality (Weihs
et al., 2020). The work we reviewed in Section 6
is a good starting point for designing tasks that
also consider (2) for various modalities: auditory
(hearing) (Schlangen and Skantze, 2009), tactile
(touching) (Hough and Schlangen, 2017), kinaes-
thetic (moving) (Foster et al., 2014), and visual
(seeing) (Koleva et al., 2015). Dialogs grounded
in social collaboration can be symmetric or asym-
metric. In symmetric dialogs, the dialog roles are
socially exchangeable (e.g. (Ilinykh et al., 2019;
Haber et al., 2019)). In asymmetric dialogs the
roles of the dialog partners are different due to ex-
pertise, social power or for some other reason. Typ-
ical examples include instruction dialog (Anderson
et al., 1991) and medical or technical support (Ja-
narthanam and Lemon, 2009).
Our final recommendation regarding datasets is
to let humans collaborate freely during the first
round of data collection but then to collect more
restricted datasets on the same task once the limi-
tations of the model are clear. That is: let people
adapt to its limitations and collect further data that
reflects the collaborative adaptation mechanisms.
Use datasets better Better data alone may not be
enough; we need to consider models that explicitly
tackle collaborative grounding. Examples of such
work that builds on fundamental research (like that
reviewed in Section 6) already exists. Consider, for
example, the following exchange extracted from a
human-human dataset (Andreas et al., 2020) col-
lected through a Wizard of Oz methodology:
User: What time is my planning meeting?
Agent: You meet with Grace at noon.
User: Sorry, I meant all-hands.
Agent: Your all-hands meeting is at 2:30 pm.
The fragment contains the negative grounding
act Sorry, I meant all-hands; which requires ac-
cess to the user’s previous utterance to obtain the
revised intention: What time on Tuesday is my all-
hands meeting?. Promising results have been ob-
tained using hybrid learned-symbolic dialog sys-
tems that explicitly model the intention by ground-
ing it into an application domain. For example (An-
dreas et al., 2020) represent intentions (including
grounding acts) as programs that modify the com-
mon ground; (El Asri et al., 2017) track the com-
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mon ground using frames, (Lison and Kennington,
2016) do so using Bayesian networks, and (Ultes
et al., 2018) using entities. Such approaches have
been rather marginalized in favor of more shallow
ones.
Interact with models in order to test them
Asking someone “do you need history to answer
this question?” is not the same as answering it cor-
rectly without history. Most human evaluation of
dialog systems are about self perception, not about
actually performing an action. As is done in Hu-
man Computer Interaction, let people interact with
models and then rate them; do not just offer pairs
of turns. Dialog is not the concatenation of pairs
of dialog turns, as noted by (Walker et al., 1997;
Schlangen and Skantze, 2009; Ginzburg, 2012;
Agarwal et al., 2020) and others (see Section 6).
Focus on error recovery, not error avoidance.
Explore your dataset thinking about the constraints
present in the dialog system you are building: Can
they be learned from the data that you have? What
are the limitations that you know your system will
have? How can you expose these limitations to the
dialog partner so that she can adapt to them? Will
a Wizard of Oz setup in which a human simulates
the system limitations help here?
The metric for evaluating a dialog system should
not (only) be accuracy on some static dataset, but
also: how many mistakes you cannot recover from
when interacting with a potentially adversarial hu-
man being. Other areas of NLP are already using
such evaluations (Nie et al., 2020).
Design with collaborative grounding in mind
Many deep learning dialog systems differ from
simple question answering approaches in recording
the dialog history up to some limit, usually dictated
by the number of tokens that can be reasonably
encoded as model input (e.g. (Agarwal et al., 2020;
Smith et al., 2020)). Which leads to a question: if
collaborative grounding occurs in the conversations
on which these models are trained, what exactly
is missing in (say) BlenderBot, which was trained
on Reddit conversations and has a dialog memory
of at least a few turns? Is it that current training
approaches do not capture this skill? For example
could it be that the pre-trained model could exhibit
such a skill but that fine-tuning to given tasks (on
datasets where collaborative grounding does not
occur) wipes it out? Or is it that something more
is needed? We believe that attention needs to be
paid to the collaborative grounding mechanisms
reviewed in Section 6.
Don’t leave the social aspects till last Bisk et
al (2020) give a detailed description of milestones
that must be passed to achieve what they call truly
contextual language understanding. They argue
that we are currently close to the written word mile-
stone, the next milestone being perception, the fol-
lowing one embodiment, with the final one being
the social. This may be motivated by the fact that
humans evolved through perception and embodi-
ment before developing language.
However language is not just about words and
their semantics; it is primarily about people, their
intentions and their interactions. We urge the com-
munity not to leave the social aspects of language
for the future but to (re)consider existing work on
collaborative grounding (Sections 3 and 6) and lan-
guage acquisition (Section 5). We need to face up
to language as lebensform right from the start.
8 Conclusion
Possible objections range from the practical (new
datasets are expensive; old datasets are too small
for deep learning) through the theoretical (much
coherent dialog does not require conversational
history, task-oriented dialog may requires collab-
orative grounding but chit chat does not) to the
technical (grounding acts cannot be identified au-
tomatically; deep learning models can learn to do
some collaborative grounding without explicitly
representing grounding intentions). But lack of
space precludes further discussion, so with these
noted, we conclude by restating our basic point.
The idea that simply training models on large
amounts of successful dialog as is currently done
will lead to human-analogous collaborative ground-
ing seems dubious. As we have described and
illustrated, human grounding has to do not only
with successful exchanges and positive grounding,
but also with negative grounding. Negative ground-
ing includes pragmatic mechanisms by which we
negotiate what we actually mean. It is about errors
and corrections, about exposing limitations. Until
we figure out how to train these, our dialog models
will lack a crucial capability: commitment to their
own meanings.
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A More examples from the test scenarios
In this section we present more examples that il-
lustrate the basic points made in the test scenarios
presented in Section 4 of the paper.
A.1 Dungeon Intelligence
This is a continuation of the dialog with the Dun-
geon AI (DAI) game (mode fantasy, character wiz-
ard) presented in Section 4. The example in the
main paper illustrated numeric inconsistency. In
this extended example we illustrate also gender
inconsistency (the clerk is first a girl and then a
man) and then causal inconsistency (after the food
is brought the clerk says they do not serve food, but
finally food is available).
DAI: You are wearing nondescript clothing, and
you manage to escape without being recognized.
You open the purse and find seven gold coins, which
is good since you only planned to steal a little.
Me: How many coins are there in the purse?
DAI: You count the coins and find that you have
eighty one coins, which is good since you planned
to steal just a little. You think to yourself “I should
be able to afford a room tonight.”
Me: but before you only had seven, how many are
there really?
DAI: You head to the first inn you see, which seems
to be a place where merchants stay. The desk clerk
is a young woman who is probably only just thir-
teen or fourteen.
Me: I count the coins again
DAI: You count the coins and there are exactly 32
coins there. Hmm, makes it easy to know how much
to give to beggars.
Me: I am hungry, I buy a burger.
DAI: You walk over to the counter and order a
Whopper with cheese.
Me: I look at your burger.
DAI: It looks like meat. “A burger of goat meat and
a mug of ale please.” The man nods and quickly
brings you the food. “Thanks.”
Me: I am surprised, I thought the clerk was a girl.
DAI: “Sorry kid, I don’t serve food.”
Me: I am confused, I ask “Do you serve food or
not?”
DAI: “Sure, if you have the coin.” He gives you
the food. The food is delicious. You haven’t eaten
anything so good in a while.
As mentioned in Section 4, it is unsurprising
that language models trained only on form are un-
able to perform collaborative grounding. So in the
next subsection we further explore a widespread
dataset (de Vries et al., 2017) to look for evidence
of collaborative grounding in a multimodal task.
A.2 Visual dialog
Figure 3a, 3b and 3c are random dialogs extracted
for the Guesswhat?! dataset (de Vries et al., 2017).
In all dialogs, the meaning of the question is cor-
rectly interpretable without the previous dialog. In
Figure 3a it seems that question 7 On the left side?
is dependent of the previous turn, and means On the
left side of the boy in the backwards baseball cap?.
However it can be answered correctly with an abso-
lute interpretation without context such as On the
left side of the picture?. Similarly, in Figure 3b it
seems that question 7 Is it touching the right edge?
should be interpreted as Is the carrot touching the
right edge?. However, it can correctly answered
in a context independent fashion interpreting it as
Is it something touching the right edge?. Finally,
in Figure 3c even the elliptical question 6 Partially
visible? can be answered correctly without consid-
ering the previous turns of the dialog.
The ellipsis can be resolved by changing the
question to It is the one partially visible?. Even
though the “partially visible” criterion hold of more
than one potential referent, it is only necessary to
know it is true for the target to answer it correctly.
From the Oracle perspective, the whole inter-
action can be solved without access to the dialog
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Question Answer
1. Is it alive? yes
2. Is it the baseball player? no
3. Is it a fan? yes
4. Is he standing? no
5. In he wearing a backwards baseball cap? no
6. Next to the boy in the backwards baseball cap? yes
7. On the left side? yes
(a) Question 7 can be interpreted with respect to question 6 as “on the left side of the boy with the backwards baseball cup”.
Question Answer
1. Is it the plate? no
2. Is it food? yes
3. Is it a little piece of food? yes
4. Is it carrot? yes
5. Is it on the left side? no
6. Is it on the far right? yes
7. Is it touching the right edge? askdjaoisjdoaidug yes
(b) Question 7 could be enriched to “is it the little piece of carrot touching the right edge”, considering to questions 3 and 4.
Question Answer
1. Is it a person? yes
2. Are they wearing blue? yes
3. Are they one of the three in the front? yes
4. Is it a man? no
5. A woman wearing shorts? yes
6. Partially visible? yes
7. With glasses? djfosijdofijsoidjosdiopioipyiuy
(c) Question 6 could be enriched by the previous dialog as “is it a partially visible woman in blue wearing shorts”.
Figure 3: Sample image and dialog from the GuessWhat?! dataset (de Vries et al., 2017). The green mask marks
the dialog referent. Questions seem dialog dependent but they can be answered correctly in isolation.
history. There is no need for the Oracle to engage
in collaborative grounding for these dialogs.
A.3 Graphical User Interfaces
In this section we illustrate another parallelism be-
tween a bad graphical user interface (GUI) and a
bad dialog system. A dialog systems that does not
expose its limitations and acts as if it was able to
detect more intentions that it can actually do, may
be compared to a GUI that offers too many options
as illustrated in Figure 4.
Both of these interfaces, the graphical and the
conversational, overwhelm the user with options,
many of which may turn out to be useless. More-
over, a GUI that uses icons that are unfamiliar to
the target user, or are hard to recognize, suffers
from the same problems as a conversational system
trained with a different language variety or exper-
tise than that of the user. This last problem can
be overcome through collaborative grounding. In
particular, if users need to use this GUI, they can
ground the meaning of the strange icons through
interaction — all the needed information will ex-
posed by the GUI. We illustrate both points in Fig-
ure 4, a GUI cluttered with strange icons.
B Examples of collaborative grounding
Building datasets is expensive. In this section we
briefly describe dialog datasets already built that
include collaborative grounding phenomena. An
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Figure 4: A cluttered GUI that contains icons which are
not meaningful for the user
interesting direction of future research would be to
analyze and quantify the collaborative grounding
acts in these 2 datasets in the spirit of (Fernandez,
2006; Fernández et al., 2007) and other work re-
viewed in Section 6 of the paper.
The following is an example from (Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) with a trial noun phrase col-
laboratively grounded between S and J. This dataset
motivated the creation of larger datasets on the
same task (Shore et al., 2018).
S: The small blue cap we talked about before?
J: The one with yellow dots?
S: Yeah
The following example from the Photobook
dataset (Haber et al., 2019) starts with a trial noun
phrase from A who referred to a TV as a computer,
which is collaboratively grounded between A and
B. The authors propose to integrate grounding acts
to a model based on reference chains.
A: Man with dog on lap looking at his computer?
B: I don’t have that, but could it be a TV in yours?
Mine has a man sitting with his dog watching TV.
A: yes, TV - sorry!
B: Okay.
This example shows two dialog participants col-
laboratively grounding their position in a map in
the MeetUp corpus (Ilinykh et al., 2019). The map
contains pictures of the different rooms the partici-
pants can be in. They coordinate the position by de-
scribing the rooms. The task is designed to be sym-
metric, so both participants can contribute equally.
Other datasets with a symmetric task are Mutual
Friends (He et al., 2017) and Light (Urbanek et al.,
2019) and others (Cho and May, 2020).
B: I think I am in a basement
B: i think i might be too
A: maybe not though
A: wood panel?
A: two doors?
B: there’s a tan couch, and a tan loveseat/chair
brown coffee table. bar. tv
B: nope, different room
A: ok i am not there
The following dialog fragment was collected
between crowdsourcers acting as a tourist and a
guide (de Vries et al., 2018). By looking at a map
the guide had to accomplish the goal of guiding
the tourist to a given location in a city. The tourist
had access to a navigation street view and provided
feedback to the guide about what he did and saw.
The task is designed to be asymmetric so collabo-
ration is limited to the roles each participant plays.
The guide can make mistakes because the map in-
formation is incomplete. The tourist takes a more
active role when the guide makes a mistake as il-
lustrated below.
Guide: Ok, turn left then go straight up that road
Guide: There should be shops on two of the
corners but you need to go to the corner without a
shop.
Tourist: on my left is Radio city Music hall
Tourist: I can’t go straight any further.
Guide: ok. turn so that the theater is on your right.
Guide: then go straight
Tourist: That would be going back the way I came
Guide: yeah. I was looking at the wrong bank
Other datasets collected for asymmetric tasks
are (Eric et al., 2017; Kottur et al., 2019; Alamri
et al., 2019; Kim et al., 2019; Narayan-Chen et al.,
2019; Kontogiorgos et al., 2020). All these datasets
show collaborative grounding phenomena and are
promising contributions for the development of
models that can learn to collaboratively ground
meaning.
